

(MALACCOMPLIS)


Note III
FAITS ACCOMPLIS AND THE ORIGINS OF CRISIS (continued)

HOW TO PRODUCE A FAIT ACCOMPLI

One way to understand the operational goals of a fait accompli is to concede it as aimed at producing a change in the status quo, against the interests of an opposing state, without creating a crisis for the leaders of that opposing state. In this context, we may think of a "crisis" as an urgent search by policymakers for means to influence or prevent this change; an ~~everytime~~ search presupposes some hope of success in finding a solution. It presumes a situation that is seen as a challenge. The fait accompli is intended to abort this search, by confronting the opposing decisionmakers, not with a challenge, but with a hopeless situation, one in which their interests are damaged but which they are powerless to restore to the old status quo or which they can oppose only with measures that seem obviously too risky, too costly, or too ineffective to be worth considering. Success in the fait accompli consists in convincing the opposing leaders -- despite their ~~surprise~~, ^(This) shock, and consciousness of a reverse -- immediately, or very quickly, before the urgent and serious search for effective action that constitutes a crisis fully develops, that they have no worthwhile alternative to inaction. Furthermore, if the leaders reach ^{and to cover them of this} ~~are led to~~ this conclusion, they can be expected to try to reduce the domestic political consequences of the national reverse for themselves, by deprecating the significance of the defeat or even by interpreting it as a desirable change.

This goal still does not account for the dominant ~~strategic~~ tactics of the fait accompli: speed, secrecy, and deception. These three

characteristics aim at producing a surprise for the opponent, and this
in turn is related to the need ^(in the preceding phase) to reduce his readiness to respond
effectively in time.



Now, it is not always useful to postpone an opponent's response to one's action by misleading him and encouraging unreadiness. If it is, it must be because the situation that the opponent will confront at a later stage of one's operation will appear more discouraging to contesting action than it would have appeared at an earlier stage, ^{then it would} or if the opponent had been ready to act more promptly. This is not always the case, though it may be hard to respond, it may be no harder to respond late than early; the change, appearing suddenly and unequivocally in an advanced state, may appear more threatening than if it had emerged gradually; the tactics of speed, secrecy and deception accompanying the move may in themselves be regarded as highly provocative. (This last possibility, which we shall discuss at length, seems often to be underestimated by those contemplating a fait accompli.) Circumstances that do have this implication can usually be described in the following terms: there is a vulnerable stage in the sequence of preparations and moves leading to the change in the status quo, during which the opponent could block or deter or reverse the development relatively easily, cheaply, and risklessly, with means at his disposal, if he were aware of the development and could make his decisions and employ these means fast enough, within

the vulnerable period. But if his awareness can be delayed, or his reactions slowed, or the period of vulnerability compressed relative to his reaction time, a state of affairs may arise in which the actions that would have been effective earlier would no longer promise results, and there are in the new situation no alternative cheap, easy, or unrisky measures that look effective.

[REDACTED] There is simply no point in going to the trouble of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] compressing to the utmost one's preparations for a move, of keeping them secret, or misleading an opponent into a state of unreadiness, unless these tactics are going to make it significantly harder for the opponent to respond, or less likely that he will respond violently or effectively. The circumstances that recommend themselves to a fait accompli must be such that the chances of an effective response seem to be lowered [REDACTED] significantly/preventing any early response. This is a matter of judgment, and in the historic cases of faits accomplis to be considered, [REDACTED] an observer of the attempts might disagree that they fitted these circumstances; nevertheless, we can assume that the initiators of the attempts [REDACTED] focused upon the [REDACTED] high vulnerability [REDACTED] of this action in the earlier phases and (perhaps mistakenly) deprecating, relatively, the vulnerability [REDACTED] of the later phases of the move and the provocativeness of the tactics. The following descriptions, then, represent guesses at the salient features of the moves as seen by the initiators.

cf. 31t

In the classic case of the military fait accompli the move in question is a movement of troops across national frontiers to occupy territory.

During the phase of preparations for this movement, it might be blocked by mobilization, redeployment, or a higher state of alert within the victim's territory (or, even at more risk, by a limited ^{preventive} pre-empted attack). It might be deterred by explicit warnings, threats, and commitments of violent retaliation; or by appeals to and commitments by third parties; or by arousing world public opinion or even opposing factions within the aggressor's country. All of these moves aimed at producing inhibiting counterpressures within the aggressor's alliances, ^{would be} its public, or ^{its} etc (its) government. Likewise, during the actual movement of troops across the border, they may be vulnerable to flanking attacks that would disorganize them or cut them off, or to air attacks upon the advancing column or upon their supporting elements and supply train. Moreover, if the defender is ready to respond promptly at all, he may have [redacted] good terrain in which to exploit the advantages of the defense. If, however, in his unready state, the defender is not occupying this good defensive terrain at all, or is quickly pushed out of it, it may be the attacker who can move into and develop the high ground, the river line, or the coastal frontier. As time goes on, and he moves troops and supplies, digs in and develops the defenses, [redacted] it is he who enjoys the advantages of defense; nor does he offer his opponent the opportunity to catch him unawares. Moreover, [redacted] his surprise move may have achieved this situation relatively bloodlessly, minimizing the provocation of the move itself. It may be evident, however, that to force him out of the position he has attained, in his alerted and defensive position, would not only be costly for the attacker, but could be achieved

only by inflicting great loss of life upon its forces, a challenge which would "force" him to respond strongly. He is, in short, "committed" to defending the "new status quo." As time goes on this degree of commitment (which was minimal in the earliest stages of the aggressive movement) increases still further, as does the "legitimacy," de facto, of the new status quo.

For the fait accompli to be attractive, the end result must be a situation in which even certainty of the state of affairs or of events to come -- that is, even disclosure, ~~and~~ the ^{and} loss of secrecy -- is not enough to move the opponent to counteraction. (Before this final state were achieved, there might be distinguishable, intervening ~~two~~ stages symbolized most simply by a three-phase pattern: Phase 1, in which even a ~~moderate~~ moderately high expectation would lead to effective counteraction; Phase 2, in which near-certainty would be required but would be enough; and Phase 3, in which even certainty would not evoke action, the situation appearing hopeless.)

All of this discussion has focused on the possibility and the ^{three} motives of decisive counteraction, but there are ~~other~~ other sorts of responses to warning that the initiator of the fait accompli must prevent.

a. Alerts, increases in readiness, preparatory moves that lower the costs or risks ~~of~~ or increase the effectiveness of later countermoves that might be undertaken in response to further warning. In effect, such moves destroy the ^{three} two-phase pattern by making it roughly as easy to block late moves in the sequence as early ones.

b. Measures to improve warning; increases in collection, transmission or analysis of information. These make it more difficult for the initiator to preserve secrecy "long enough," that is, throughout Phase 1.

(Abandoning secrecy risks the measure; any insure commitment, while secrecy encourages commitment (especially if domestic opposition isn't forced)).

c. Commitments to counteraction that make it less easy for the opponent to avoid taking even costly or dangerous counteraction, given sufficiently unequivocal evidence of the move. One of the important crises patterns to be analyzed -- a pattern, as it happens, of miscalculation on both sides -- is that the ^{un}~~secret~~ secrecy and deception intended by the initiator of the fait accompli to prevent/countermoves, increases in readiness, or increased reconnaissance and warning capability, have the undesired and unanticipated effect of encouraging commitments that make eventual radical counteraction much more likely, or inevitable. Moreover, because ~~of~~ the nature and impact of these commitments may not be well understood by ~~the~~ foreign analysts, and the degree to which they actually tie the hands of national leaders may be heavily discounted or unnoticed abroad, the occurrence of these commitments may not serve as danger signals to the initiator of the fait accompli that his tactics are in trouble.

All of the above examples illustrate the two-phase pattern we have described abstractly. Of course, to divide complex sequences of events sharply into a small number of phases is artificial; yet, in these ~~situations~~ situations, the notion of abrupt and significant changes in state, discontinuous shifts in vulnerability, seems less artificial as an abstraction than the alternative notion of smooth variations. A boundary is crossed with uniformed troops; missiles arrive at a port, and then at sites; a position is occupied and a defensive perimeter established; an air defense system goes operational, with radars turned on, missiles armed and fueled, communications working, ~~the~~ the system manned with experienced operators; none of these happenings are strictly points in time -- they all have duration, with some vagueness and arbitrariness at

their edges -- yet they are all events that can be located relatively precisely on a time dimension, and they tend to make a sharp difference.
the happen,
After them, things are not the same.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To recapitulate: before events have reached one of these turning points, relatively cheap or riskless actions would be effective in deterring or blocking later stages of the move, whereas in what we shall call Phase 2 [REDACTED] no such "easy" countermoves, including these, would be effective. Even in Phase 1, though the appropriate countermoves would be cheap, they would not be free, or totally without risk; they would not be undertaken unless necessary. Typically, they would not be undertaken unless there was some degree of expectation, some subjective probability in the minds of the leaders of the opposing state, that an unfavorable change in the status quo was being prepared. But even a fairly low probability of this might be enough to trigger these early blocking, deterring, or alerting moves. ^P In the later phase, if any effective countermoves are available at our all, they are, by assumption, so costly or risky that they would not be undertaken unless they were almost certainly needed; they are regarded as so serious -- for instance, ultimatums, mobilization, shifts in alliances, drastic changes in basic policies, or major military attacks -- that a high false alarm rate could not be tolerated. This attitude will be reflected in a requirement for a high degree of probability that the unfavorable development is at hand before these actions will be undertaken. ^P So far as deception is concerned, then, the problem for the initiator of the fait accompli is less stringent in Phase 2 than earlier; he need not prevent all

suspicion as to his intention or actions, but merely prevent the opponent
~~(angels close to~~ from attaining^P near-certainty. Even this may eventually become difficult.
In fact, the time will almost surely come when the opponent does "know for
a fact" what is about to happen, or what has already occurred. If at this
moment, not having acted sooner, the intended victim finds counteraction
essential, and takes it, despite its costs and risks for both parties,
then the only effect of the tactics of fait accompli have been to delay
the confrontation and to contrive that it should take place on a higher
level of violence. This represents a failure of the tactics, regardless
of the eventual outcome. Likewise, as I have suggested earlier, the tac-
tics have suffered a relative failure if the opponent even seriously
considers such countermoves^{Plan 3}, that is, if a decisionmaking "crisis" results
in which these radical countermoves have a significantly high probability
of emerging. What is desired is^{the opponents} recognition that even radical and violent
countermoves would be ineffective, or very excessively costly or risky,
and for this conclusion^{should} to be reached so ~~soon~~ quickly and so confidently
such moves get no real consideration.

III

It must be kept in mind that we are describing here not military operations aimed at the destruction or surrender of the opposing state, but aimed rather at the acceptance by the opposing state of a limited loss of its territorial integrity; although, on a larger scale, the same considerations might arise in the process of destroying the sovereign state when it is important to discourage intervention by allies or third parties.

P The pattern appears, in the small, in its classic form in Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland, and on the larger scale, in his carrying out of the Anschluss with Austria, his occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement, ~~and his occupation~~, and his Blitzkrieg attacks upon Poland, ~~the Netherlands~~, Norway, the Lowlands, and France. (Although none of these, except the Rhineland, was limited with respect to the individual victim nations, a major consideration in each was to discourage its Allies from carrying out their obligations and third parties from intervening.) More recently, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor fitted the classic pattern of the limited military fait accompli. Likewise, the North Korean attack in 1950, similarly, the attack of the Israelis into the Sinai Peninsula, and the simultaneous British and French operation along the Suez Canal in 1956, although the object in this case was not ultimately to hold territory or to exploit a defensive position. Finally, surprise and deception were used in the abortive verbal ~~invasion~~ invasion of at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, to give heavily outmanned forces a chance to establish a beachhead long ~~far~~ enough for hoped-for political developments, (and, ~~events~~, to justify ~~it~~ direct support).

SAC

large

The Soviet establishment of a/military base and missile sites ~~of~~ in Cuba in August to October 1962, was not an aggressive military fait accompli in a ~~classic~~ sense, but ~~it~~ did present in classic form the ~~the~~ two-phase characteristics that recommend the tactics of a fait accompli. Disclosures during the preparations for the move could have resulted in political, diplomatic, and economic countermeasures, and more significant, even more powerful domestic pressures upon the President to resist the move than were actually generated. The movement itself was vulnerable to interdiction by a blockade. Moreover, pressures could have been brought to bear on Cubans to change their mind about accepting the move. Although the Soviet commitment was considerably increased and the effectiveness of protest ~~of~~ blockade progressively reduced as Soviet personnel and equipment actually arrived in Cuba, ^{the installation} ~~it~~ was still relatively vulnerable to air attack, but prior to the achievement of operational status by the SAM system or by individual missile sites. A second phase would distinctly have arrived, however, but ~~exxxtre~~ once the equipment, including IRBMs, war heads and fuel, had all arrived, the SAM system including its communications was fully operational, and at least some of the MRBMs were in an alert, operational status. No longer would a selected military blockade have had any significance whatever, nor would a limited "surgical" attack have eliminated the offensive trap; ^{(a limited attack-} ~~it~~ could serve only as a demonstration; ^{capabilty} and against operational missiles, a significantly risky one. The remaining alternative^{other}, other than mere protest or the author^{other} of negotiations and trades, would have been a full blockade, a long process of questionable effectiveness.

and devices within the Alliances; An air attack upon a very large target system with high collateral damage and the risk of significant local, counter-action; and/or an invasion. (As noted above, Soviet move itself could not be regarded as aggression, although this label was in fact used rather freely; *on the contrary, the need for/a fait accompli was to prevent U.S. counteractions*)

that they could themselves be regarded as aggressive. However, there are interesting similarities to this case in the episodes of the Rhineland and the Anschluss. In each of these cases, the character of the military move as "aggression" was considerably ambiguous, a fact which definitely slowed the reactions of at least some third parties.)

At this point in the discussion we can see why it is that a near-success in a fait accompli, that is, a near miss, can be more dangerous for the initiator than a total failure. A total failure might consist of the opponent getting his ~~wind up~~ very early in the game, and proceeding to block subsequent moves or ~~inequivocally~~ to increase ~~his~~ readiness or warning, or commitment, all at a fairly low level of international tension. Alternatively, the initiator may have made a major miscalculation, overlooking a simple and effective countermove which the opponent employs without hesitation even late in the sequence.

- ¶ A much more dangerous mistake is to have calculated correctly that the ~~assuming the threat~~ opponent, late in the game, will find only violent, risky countermoves ~~with considering~~, ~~of any promise~~, but to have underestimated ("slightly") the opponent's ~~his~~ willingness to use these moves. Another dangerous failure, ~~a fait~~ ~~success of the~~ ~~malaccompli~~, in a three-phase situation, is for the "cover of the ~~fail, during~~ operation to be "blown," the opponent, ~~alarmed~~, not in Phase I but in ~~in measures~~ ~~when non-violent blocking~~ Phase II, when near certainty is enough to move the opponent to violent ~~measures~~ ~~when he adequately~~ counteraction (whereas Phase III would have been a safe harbor for the initiator, if the opponent could have been kept uncertain just a bit longer). What makes attempts at fait accompli highly relevant to a study of crises is the frequency with which intense crises are, in fact, caused by just these sorts of failures. And in a study of fait accompli per se, the frequency with which these failures occur needs explanation, as does the fact that they come so frequently as surprises to the initiator, although ~~the~~ Nevertheless, in this specific context they may occur as a surprise, there is enough general appreciation of these risks that major faits

accomplis are generally regarded as dangerous, even desperate attempts. That raises the question as to why such all-or-nothing strategies are adopted ~~at all~~. In particular cases, the answer may be that the risks ^{at all} are underestimated or not seen ~~at all~~, the strategy seems cheap or relatively promising. But in other cases, including most of those examples mentioned above, though the risks were underestimated they were still seen as high. Why were they accepted? Why were [redacted] moves attempted and tactics adopted that, failing, [redacted] threw their opponents into crises that, ^{led} in turn, into intense crises for the initiator? ^{? P} ~~the historical examples~~ One finds in a significant number of ~~them~~ that the situation that preceded and led to the attempted fait accompli [redacted] had many of the characteristics of a crisis within the initiator's government. In particular, one finds that a sense of deadline dominated/policy discussion, a sense that time was running out, that action must be undertaken urgently if at all. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] The heads of state faced with what they regard as a "last chance" to avert or reverse an unfavorable train of events, whether or not circumstances were about to turn dramatically for the worse, the key consideration was that it was ^{soon} about to become impossible to [redacted] improve them or stop the downward trend, even by radical means. It was in this mood that radical means began to be contemplated. Thus, Hitler in 1937, 1938, and in 1939 hammered away at his reluctant generals on the necessity for carrying out [redacted] [redacted] what they regarded as desperate gambles before his opponents

completed their rearmament (and before he himself might be eliminated -- a deadline probably more significant for him than for his listeners). The all-or-nothing sweep of the Japanese in the Pacific, including the surprise at Pearl Harbor, followed from a fairly precise calculation of the approaching moment at which their imperial ambitions would otherwise have to be abandoned, due to strangulation of their oil supplies and war materiel.

(for the U.S. decisionmakers,
In the case of the Bay of Pigs, the deadline) was reportedly provided by the impending arrival of MIGs and Czech-trained pilots and of other defensive weapons in Cuba, and at the same time by the imminent decay of the covertly trained rebel forces as an instrument through denial of their bases and loss of their "cover." According to published accounts, (no evidence on this question has been available to me, and I cite these [redacted] conjectures merely to illustrate the principle),^{it was estimated that} the operation was almost sure to be successful if undertaken in the next month or two (April or May 1961), and almost surely infeasible after that. Whether ^{actually} or not these were the estimates in that situation, it is in this frame of mind that radical actions ^{are} contemplated.

On the other hand, when the fait accompli is seen not as a desperate move but as a fairly unrisky one, the factor of timing may again be important; the risks may be seen as low because of particular circumstances related to the timing. There may be special, and fleeting, opportunities for covering the operation or distracting the opponent in its early phases. Or special [redacted] factors may be thought to operate, at a particular time and for a limited period, to inhibit the opponent

from reacting either early or late. Thus, a factor in the timing of the Israeli attack on the Sinai Peninsula in 1956 was said to be the Israeli calculation that a U.S. president would be too preoccupied to react decisively in the weeks prior to a presidential election, and moreover would be unwilling to move against the Israelis at the cost of Jewish votes. Likewise, as I shall discuss in detail, the deployment of missiles to Cuba in 1962 may have been timed so that the relatively vulnerable pre-operational phase would conclude just after the U.S. Congressional election, on the assumption that the administration would be unwilling to admit a challenge to action just prior to the elections.

In both sorts of cases, the calculations leading to desperation or of hope, indicating last chances or fleeting opportunities, were unknown to foreign heads of state at the time, and might well have appeared astounding and absurd, as well as ominous, if they had been known. The actions that these calculations led to came as surprises to these opponents, because they were not only ignorant of the calculations, the mood of desperation or optimism, but did not know what they did not know. They felt confident that they knew their opponent's thoughts and designs. They felt confident, incorrectly, that they knew their opponent's designs. But because those opponents kept their calculations private and prepared their actions in secret, they in turn denied themselves the chance of discovering mistakes and miscalculations. They denied a hearing to wisdom having mistakes revealed to them before it was too late, the chance of being convinced in time, the opportunity would not soon disappear, or that it had already disappeared, or that the desperate action being prepared had no chance of succeeding, or every chance of provoking

disastrous reprisal. Thus the crisis was prepared.

So far the secrecy and deception that characterize the attempted fait accompli have been related to their effect in deterring action by the opposing heads of state. [redacted]

[redacted] But it may be regarded as of equal or even greater importance to conceal the preparations from two other audiences: (a) the opponent's public; (b) the initiator's own public, certain or/parts of his government. Let us take the latter first. The head of state contemplating a certain change in the international status quo may anticipate opposition from his own bureaucracy, or his public, or from allies or neutrals: opposition to the move itself, to its costs or the risks of counteraction, or to the methods involved. Secrecy of preparations, and deceptive statements and moves, could allow him to get ahead with preparations, at least, for the move, without arousing this opposition. He might or might not propose to carry these preparations straight through to decisive action. He might, indeed, share the reservations of the critics of the move so long as ^{the current} immediate circumstances obtained, but he might wish to be in position to carry it out quickly (and thus, given the prior secrecy), in the form of a fait accompli if circumstances changed.

On the other hand, if he can prevent his domestic or allied opposition from stifling the move in its earliest phases, he may hope to buy their approval with its eventual success. The only way to achieve this goal might [redacted] be to conceal the operation from its potential critics and opponents. Even after success, the leader would then face charges of misleading those whom he had a responsibility to inform; but [redacted]

(as it would be overshadowed by failure)

the impact of this charge would be reduced by success, and reduced still further if it could be claimed that the secrecy was intrinsic to the success, that is, that it ^{were} essential to mislead the international ^{more open and direct} opponents. Thus, even though other/factors may be roughly as promising so far as the opponent is concerned, the fait accompli may recommend itself as an approach because of the [redacted]
[redacted] need, in fact, to confront one's own public or bureaucracy or allies with the move as a fait accompli. The S_y of Pigs would seem an obvious example.
[redacted]

The other [redacted] circumstances that recommend the fait accompli are those in which it is the attitude of the opponent's public or allies or bureaucracy that is feared rather than the personal responses of the opposing leaders themselves. Those leaders, whether they recognize the projected move early or late, might be expected to be acquiescent (^{even if unwillingly}) ~~whether~~ happy or not if they were insulated from domestic pressures. The problem, then, is to keep the project secret, not so much from them as from the hotheaded elements in their population or alliances. It may be necessary to deceive the leaders themselves, but only as incidental or instrumental to the [redacted] end of deceiving these pressure groups. Since this presumes that the opposing leaders are believed to have significantly different attitudes or tendencies to action from dominant elements in their bureaucracy or populace, it might seem to be a very special situation. Yet/belief figures in a striking number of the attempted faits accomplis that we have mentioned. Perhaps the reason is that this perception (that the [redacted])

opposing head is much less disposed to [redacted] counter a particular move than important parts of his population, and perhaps much less opposed to the move than his public position would suggest) is particularly encouraging to an attempted fait accompli. It appears ^{to be} a hedge against sloppiness in maintaining secrecy, for the opposing leader is expected, in effect, to cooperate in maintaining that secrecy against its true target, the opponent's public; moreover, he is not expected to be quick on the trigger in responding to ambiguous indications, so that the risks [redacted] due to leakage are reduced. To adopt the tactic of the fait accompli may even be seen as a favor to the opposing head of state. Whether he is thought to approve the [redacted] move,
or to disapprove of it mildly or strongly, it is believed that he would prefer to be confronted [redacted] with it suddenly in an "irreversible" form, rather than to be challenged to action by an overt process that would arouse his domestic activists. *Consciously* ~~Eisenhower~~ ^{had} himself ^{in mind} that this was ~~Eisenhower's~~ ^{his} state of mind prior to the initiation of ~~any~~ ^{the} ~~initial~~ ^{initial} ~~move~~ ^{into play.}

The combination of both the above motives occurs when one presents an ally with an act as a fait accompli, not because the allied head of state himself opposes it, but in order to relieve him [redacted] in the eyes of his own public or of common enemies ^{from} responsibility for the move or from opportunity and hence responsibility to oppose it. Thus, the British and French took for granted that Eisenhower would approve the end result of their Suez [redacted] operation in 1956, the toppling of Nasser, whatever he thought of the means or risks. Their tactics had the flavor of the first calculation above; but their secrecy may also have been conceived (most misguidedly) as a favor to Eisenhower,

the
relieving him of the onus of/guilty knowledge of an aggressive project.

P The tactics of the Bay of Pigs were undoubtedly dominated by the first type of consideration. But the secrecy surrounding some other clandestine operation, such as the U-2 overflights of Russia from 1956-1960, may be due to this second consideration; it may be a "favor" to the opposing head of state, [REDACTED] who, lacking ability to counter the operation effectively, would prefer that his failure not be known to his own public or that he not be challenged by his own public or allies to counteraction that would be ineffective or unwise. ~~This is a sophisticated tactic.~~ [REDACTED]

P To enlist the collaboration of an apparently implacable opponent in a pact of secrecy is a sophisticated ~~tactic~~ tactic. The fact that it can work and that it has worked is a fact ~~most~~ ^{but} appreciated by heads of state, ~~and~~ concealed by them from others. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The belief that it will work in a particular case is also, perchance, a type of miscalculation to which heads of state are peculiarly prone. It is sometimes hard to keep things in the clue. [REDACTED]

THE BUDGET PLOY

Much of the abstract pattern we have described can be seen in an episode of a different character from the other examples: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the cancelling out of the Skybolt missile. Here is a case where the vulnerability of the move depended greatly upon its timing. Early in August of 1962 McNamara [REDACTED] concluded, on the basis of studies

completed then, that the half-billion dollars still to be spent on Skybolt could be saved without loss by cancelling the weapon, given the expected effectiveness of competing weapons systems and the rising costs and low reliability of Skybolt itself.^P Somewhat later, the essential decision was made by the President, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, that the half-billion dollar saving outweighed the pain that would be caused by the cancellation to the British, though, since it was no part of their objective to embarrass the British nor to shatter the "special relationship," the President and the two Secretaries agreed on the need to find as satisfactory a compensation for the British as possible. (They were prepared, as were Macmillan and Thorneycroft, to contemplate Polaris in this role at this earlier stage, though large parts of the bureaucracy on each side of the Atlantic were not.)^P If the decision had simply been announced at the moment these conclusions were reached, it would have been shortlived. Opposition from the Air Force, supported by the aircraft industry, would have effective expression in Congress. The tactic adopted was to sit tight on the conclusions at the time and to expose them and the decision based upon them for the first time in the budget recommendations, some ^{July} three months later. If a cancellation were presented in the form of [redacted] a simple omission from an otherwise large defense budget, its vulnerability to reversal would be sharply altered. As a separate item earlier, ^{July} an abstraction from a budget, Congressional proponents of Skybolt could simply maintain that Skybolt was indispensable, leaving it to the Administration to bear the responsibility for any compensating cuts elsewhere that might be taken, or for the over-all size of the budget.

But confronted with a coherent and large budget that lacked funds for Skybolt, those who would urge that funds now be added to the budget to keep the project going, would either have to take the responsibility for swelling the ~~size~~ ^{long} of the budget still further or ^{they} could be challenged to recommend and to take responsibility for specific cuts elsewhere. Thus, what McNamara proposed was to produce a fait accompli against the Air Force and its backers in Congress.

Any leakage even suggesting the imminence of this decision could have been fatal to the project. All that was necessary to [redacted] block the move prior to December was for its opponents to raise the question in sharp debate or in a press conference to force the Administration to define its ^{current} position on Skybolt publicly and unequivocally. A premature statement of intention to drop Skybolt would then have provoked a [redacted] demonstration of public (though specialized) support for the system. The political costs of obduracy in the face of this opposition would have been intense; for one thing, the opponents of the move would be encouraged ^(by the likelihood of success) to make threats, [redacted] commitments, and alliances that ^{would}, in the end, virtually compel them to retaliate if the move was carried out. Moreover, if the alarm was sounded before suitable compensation had been worked out for the British, the Administration would be open to charges of heartlessness and betrayal, and the undesired political costs for Macmillan would be maximized. stopped ^{10/26}

Since the opposition tactics involved would be politically cheap, the slightest suspicion would be enough to provoke them; therefore, the level of suspicion had to be kept extraordinarily low. Secrecy was essential, and McNamara and the three or four assistants who were informed

of his intentions proceeded to demonstrate extraordinary talent in keeping their mouths shut. For the first month or two the proposal reached no one outside their circle, either in Defense, the State Department, the Budget Bureau or the White House. But secrecy was not enough. Some positive deception was unavoidable, both because some questions were being asked anyway, on the basis of the rumors that always arose around budget time, and because some positive action ~~was~~ required whose omission would instantly have given warning.

The time had arrived [redacted] in the development process of Skybolt when funds for production tooling would have to be released if Skybolt were to proceed into the production phase without delay. In fact, it was just because Skybolt had reached this point that the Administration was feeling the urgency of a "last chance" to cancel it. Risky and painful as it would be to cancel it even at this late stage, it would become virtually irreversible once large production commitments had been made to the project. *P* Not only was the project about to become enormously more expensive, and to acquire even more intense supporters, but the very fact of large investments to be justified would soon make cutting it off as distasteful to the administration and itself as to its current proponents, since in politics, bygones are never bygones. Thus, as usual, the tactic of the fait accompli, somewhat desperate in itself, was adopted in a move of urgency as a [redacted] last opportunity approached its deadline, beyond which even more desperate measures would be of no avail.

The Administration proceeded ~~then~~ to release limited production funds for Skybolt, thus spending money ^{in ~~for~~ ~~the~~ process} of deception, giving a powerful signal of reassurance to supporters of the program. The funds

were released on a month-by-month, ~~validly~~ tentative basis during the period of budget consideration, but this in itself gave no alarm, for such indications of soul-searching and reluctance had appeared every year ~~in the program~~ at budget time, and frequently off-season as well.

the Administration

When questions were put directly to [redacted] by Thorncroft, on the basis of more or less authoritative rumors, they were at first turned aside with deceptive or misleading answers. Here a phenomenon of fait accompli which we have discussed a little earlier was at work. There was no desire, in fact, to deceive the British cabinet or even to delay their appreciation of the Administration's intention. However, to [redacted]

inform them prematurely was to take too great a risk of warning U.S. domestic opposition, via the channel British Cabinet-RAF-USAF-Congress. In the earlier stage, then, there seemed no alternative to maintaining the deception against our ally as well. As we shall discuss, the process of [redacted] secrecy and deception has costs and risks, and these apply as well when the information is withheld from a third party simply to block a communication channel to the primary opponent. Later, when Thorncroft and Macmillan were let in on the plan (in ample time prior to the estimated "leak-date" [redacted]) -- at which time the news would hit the two publics -- for the two Cabinets to concert on a plan of compensation), the communication, for reasons of security, was informal, brief, inexplicit and strictly limited in its recipients. This, too, had its effects.

Meanwhile, the preconceptions of the "opposition" -- the backers of Skybolt -- were favorable to the strategy, for they all pointed to

the implausibility of the Administration's undertaking this move.

Indications of Administration unhappiness with Skybolt were not disquieting, for two different administrations had exhibited this unhappiness almost continuously from the outset of the program. Even fairly pointed attacks upon the program had been launched, without results. The Administration was thought unlikely to take on a new battle with the Air Force just after its recent campaign against the B-70. (Actually, it was the experience with the B-70 that had given the Administration a sense of deadline about the Skybolt; McNamara and the President now regarded it as a tactical error to have let the B-70 program continue as long/it had.) This was an underestimate of McNamara's [redacted] heart for facing political opposition in Congress.

Moreover, the proponents of Skybolt were confident that the Administration would not pay the political costs of [redacted] [redacted] intensely displeasing (indeed, politically endangering) the British Cabinet, ~~that~~ had [redacted] represented the promise of Skybolt as the major feature in its collaboration with the United States. (From one point of view, they overestimated the Administration's charity, or its prudence; from another, they underestimated the Administration's willingness to compensate the British; though, as it turned out, it was this program of compensation that was carried out least adroitly.) Finally, the opposition was reassured in the short run by the absence of any warning indications. They were confident they would receive ample warning of any proposal to cut, either from the Administration itself -- underestimating the Administration's ability to [redacted] hold tight counsel and to stop leaks -- or from the RAF -- underestimating

the Administration's willingness to postpone informing the British, or to deceive them for a limited period.

Domestically, the tactics were a complete success. Security was essentially maintained until the Secretary's budget recommendations were sent to the JCS. The Administration had managed quietly to occupy the high ground during the night, and the Air Force, recognizing the low promise of an uphill assault, accepted the change without a significant fight. The fait accompli was a success. ^(with respect to the US "opposition")

The results on the British side were more complicated, and far less happy. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Here there was no intent to delude the British Cabinet nor, if it could be avoided, to damage their interests. But ^{will} BE this willingness to spare Macmillan a fait accompli, presenting one to Congress, was a misunderstanding of Macmillan's domestic position. Macmillan and Thorneycroft, while unhappy about the move, were/prepared to accept it and could readily conceive of adequate compensation. But it was essential to them that the move, if it must take place, be presented ^{that} to them as a fait accompli. The impression would be disastrous ^{if} they had taken part in any discussion of the move, before it was settled and irreversible, ⁱⁿ which they had not opposed bitterly, or in which they had treated the continuation of Skybolt as at all negotiable. If they were to persuade the Cabinet to accept the move as a fact rather than as a challenge, they had on the one hand to be able to disclaim all responsibility (including prior information of the move), ^{and} bearing in the other hand simultaneously a concrete, generous, compensatory offer from the Americans. Only that combination could deter the pressure

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the party, from the Cabinet, the Services, /and the public to do-or-die for dear old Skybolt; a fight which Macmillan and Thorneycroft knew, better than these others, would be hopeless -- and for which they had no heart in any case. But without the generous offer from the Americans, Macmillan and Thorneycroft would be forced to fight even if the prospects were hopeless, if only to punish their ally for the humiliation of the move,

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What the U.S. Administration failed to appreciate was the urgency of Macmillan's and Thorneycroft's need to avoid appearing in the eyes of [REDACTED] the British Cabinet and Services to be trading, without a fight, the status quo on Skybolt for any change or alternative. The ^{actual} secrecy of the interaction was critical here, for it limited communication between the two heads of state and the Secretaries of Defense so sharply as to conceal from the Americans the precise nature of the English concerns. For reasons of security (including security against the U.S. bureaucracy; for reasons I shall not go into here, the U.S. offer of Polaris to the British was ^{to believe} ^{by Rusk} to be presented to the State Department as a fait accompli) it was decided to avoid formal communications and to conduct the private negotiation in person. But McNamara's interview with Thorneycroft was postponed for a variety of reasons until so late that fatal leaks had occurred to the British public and bureaucracy by the time it took place. And at this point, having failed to arrive at an adequate understanding of the British problems earlier, the Americans failed to present what Thorneycroft regarded as a minimum essential, concrete compensation: Polaris: without strings. The offer was susceptible to adjustment, as the Nassau negotiations later proved. But to be forced to [REDACTED] ask for these adjustments, ^{the bureaucracy and Service, have} in full view of the public,

rather than to be confronted with a satisfactory package on a take-it-or-leave-it basis was inexorably to challenge Macmillan and Thorneycroft to fight for the best deal they could get, not excluding, in defeatist fashion, the reversal of the decision on Skybolt itself.^P In short, Thorneycroft had wanted, ^{to confront was} a fait accompli; what he got was a crisis.^P He proceeded, as is customary in these situations, to present his tormenting opponent/allies with a crisis of their own. [REDACTED] The ensuing process, through Nassau to DeGaulle's press conference in January and beyond, abounded in insult, humiliation, and intimations of [REDACTED] maladroitness all around.

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On both sides of the Atlantic, the episode illustrated the relations between crises and attempted faits accomplis. A crisis is, for a head of state, an urgent problem-solving situation^P but a [REDACTED] problem (as distinct, say, from an unfavorable or disappointing prospect) exists only if there is some possibility of finding a "solution," that is, a course of action that can improve matters or avert a decline. A "problem" in this technical sense is a challenge to a politician, a test upon which he will be judged; if he himself has little hope of success, or disagrees that a problem exists, then he would much prefer to skip this test.^P A generous counteroffer from the Americans would have removed most of the sting from the drive to regain Skybolt, but there would have been still some implication that the change was for the worse (else why had not the British pressed for it earlier?). Therefore, if they were to be spared a crisis, Macmillan and Thorneycroft wished it evident to all that there was no possibility to influence the decision; only thus could they be excused from the responsibility to challenge it. Thus,

Thorneycroft [redacted] hoped that the [redacted] cancellation of Skybolt could be presented as due to "technical infeasibility." To resist it then would be to oppose the laws of nature; the Minister of Defense is not required to be that romantic in defending England's honor, unfortunately. The Americans concluded that it would simply be impossible to conceal the fact that ~~only~~ economic laws were at work, ~~and~~ that British sensibilities [redacted] weighed in with marginal military benefits -- were not worth half a billion dollars in the eyes of the ^{WS} Administration; the problem before the two Cabinets was precisely to lessen the humiliation for the British of this "revealed preference."

Unfortunately, the British public, Services, and Cabinet were protected from the information in the early stages of the move by the tactics of ~~and both by the Americans and by Macmillan and Thorneycroft,~~ fait accompli, when it burst upon them, as a surprise, it came prematurely, the secrecy having flown before a basic agreement had been worked out in saleable form. Yet it was not made obvious to these audiences that the situation was hopeless, that [redacted] Skybolt was out. The British press proceeded to define the situation in such a way that for Macmillan to emerge from Nassau with anything but Skybolt would be interpreted as failure. (Apparently Macmillan himself did not read this mood correctly; he left Nassau highly satisfied with the deal he had negotiated, having rejected a fairly generous offer by the United States to split the costs of continued development of Skybolt.) In short, one can fail at a fait accompli even when the opposing head of state is cooperative. And the failure is a crisis.

So far we have considered circumstances to which the tactics of fait accompli are adapted, the calculations on which an attempted fait accompli are based, and the tactics involved in the effort. We have seen that it is in the nature

of a fait accompli, if it fails to achieve passive acceptance by the opponent, that is, to succeed, to produce a crisis. For if secrecy is maintained until the closing stages of the move, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] but [REDACTED] on becoming alerted [REDACTED] the opponent is not convinced that the change is beyond influencing, and is then in an urgent decision-making situation with a short deadline, that is, a crisis. [REDACTED]
The hurried, stressful, and disorderly process of crisis decisionmaking in itself is somewhat more likely to result in radical, more violent countermoves, which are in themselves surprising and crisis-producing for the original actor, than is more leisurely decisionmaking.

It is the aim of the fait accompli to make a threatening situation seem hopeless rather than urgent: to induce withdrawal, acceptance, rationalization, change of goal, paralysis, disintegration, vacillation; ^{with its} not crisis, frantic and possibly effective search for counteractions, ^{with its} possible overtones of hysteria, panic and aggression. Yet, as we have seen, the failure of the fait accompli is likely to take the form of crisis. What we have not so far examined is why this failure occurs so often, so violently, and so surprisingly to the initiator, as it does. In particular, we must consider now the factors intrinsic to the tactic that contribute to the [REDACTED] likelihood, the intensity, and the lack of anticipation of its failure.

The failure we shall examine is one in which secrecy and deception are effective as long, or almost as long, as originally intended, but in which the opponent, instead of accepting the situation, strives to rise to the occasion and to counter or punish the move.